relations between the West and non-West are reproduced through gendering, with the objective of addressing this overlooked dimension. Moreover, it analyses gendering as a source of insecurity for the non-West with specific reference to Turkey's gendered relations with the West. This examination will be performed through the theoretical insight offered by writers about masculinities in global politics, feminist critiques of Orientalism, and postcolonial feminist literature on West/non-West relations. It also aims to discuss the narrative of non-Western decision-makers when addressing this gendered insecurity at times of military crises with a third party. This narrative has never solely targeted the perceived military threat per se, but has aimed to challenge Turkey's gendered subordination vis-à-vis the West.
The argument begins by setting out the theoretical foundation of the argument based on relevant literatures. 5 The second section will lay out the historical and political context preceding each military crisis -with Greece in 1974 and 1996 and with Syria in 2012. It will be argued that in all three historical periods Turkey's policy-makers underlined Turkey's hybridity to differentiate it from the West yet at the same time sought to embed it within the West. In this way, they attempted to address Turkey's gendered ontological insecurity. However, the military crises interrupted these processes. Finally, elements of Turkey's policy-makers' gendered narrative will be examined in moments of military crises: Turkey as a democratic teacher/guide and as a rational/not emotional state. Through this double-discursive move they attempted to drop the hybridity in favour of an approach that unconditionally constructs Turkey as a politically and epistemologically Western state, while feminizing and hypermasculinizing the military threats to represent them as 'non-Western'.
The main reason for choosing moments of military crisis in Turkey's history is to underline the significance of gendered ontological insecurity even when policy-makers face military (physical)
insecurities. Paraphrasing Krishna, 6 what really happened in these moments is less important than how policy-makers narrated them to address gendered insecurity. 'Narratives are essential (for a feminist analysis) because they are a primary way by which we make sense of the world around us, produce meanings, articulate intentions, and legitimize actions'. 7 The objective of this study is to point out a specific context (the Turkey-West gendered power hierarchy) where gendered ontological insecurity cannot be overlooked. This will be conducted through examining narratives during the moments when military insecurity was perceived intensely by policy-makers.
Gendered Ontological Insecurity of the non-West's 'Devalorized' Masculinities
Feminist International Relations offers students of the discipline 'gender lenses' through which global politics can be unpacked and problematized with the purpose of revealing its gendered characteristics. 8 This critical practice is not solely related to the wider interest of feminist IR in 'gender emancipation'; it is also related to the presumption that the problematization of global power hierarchies requires an analysis of how individuals, social groups, and geographies are continuously gendered to reconstruct these hierarchies. 9 However, power in global politics does not operate through the timeless, universal, and monolithic dichotomy between 'dominant masculinity' and 'subordinated femininity'. 10 Instead, there are multiple masculinities interacting with each other to reproduce or transform power hierarchies. While Hooper underlines the significance of 'the politics of masculinity as a contested field of power moves and resistances' in understanding global politics, 11 Tickner and Sjoberg argue that for feminist IR, which aims to reveal gendered dimensions of power relations and transform them, an examination of the complexities of masculinities is of key importance. 12 Following this line of thinking, the current gender analysis will focus on power hierarchies among masculinities within the West/non-West context.
Theory of masculinities, primarily formulated by Connell, 13 enables students of feminist IR to examine how masculinities are constructed in different historical, social, and political contexts and how structures, processes, institutions, and individuals are represented through relations among masculinities. Applying the theory to global politics, Hooper conceptualizes different masculinities of states which become prominent in changing historical periods: 'the citizen-warrior masculinity' revolving around aggressiveness, militarism, and materialistic power accumulation, and 'the bourgeois-rational masculinity', which is more egalitarian, democratic, and less aggressive. 14 The latter is both a product and producer of increasing liberal economic relations, and states are gradually gendered through this type of masculinity. 15 However, in post-9/11 global politics, more aggressive and highly militarized and exclusionary states have become dominant over other masculinized identities of states in the form of 'remasculinized' 16 or 'hypermasculinized' 17 units. This type of power hierarchies among temporal masculinities is conceptualized by Connell as a dichotomy between 'hegemonic masculinity' and 'subordinated masculinity'. 18 The concept of 'hegemonic masculinity' has provoked criticisms in feminist IR. Eichler's analysis of militarized masculinities in post-Soviet Russia highlights the improbability of any masculinity obtaining a 'hegemonic' position when multiple subordinated masculinities constantly challenge it.
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It is also argued that different social, political and economic conditions obstruct the understanding of a timeless and monolithic hegemony of one masculinity over another (such as between heterosexual and homosexual masculinities). 20 These criticisms rightly underline the necessity of approaching masculinities cautiously 'to avoid sliding into the practice of treating masculinities as singular, as static, or as decontextualized'. 21 Yet, one type of masculinity, in spite of its changing content, can enjoy dominancy over others because it provides the 'standards'. As put by Hutchings: Postcolonial feminists elaborate that these 'standards', mainly provided by the West but regenerated through the contribution of the non-West, are also products of global political and economic structures that feminize the non-West. 23 In the context of West/non-West relations, the perception of non-Western subjects that they fall short of meeting the 'standards' (or being articulated as such by the West) can be a source of insecurity for them because they are positioned as 'the feminized and hypermasculinized other' of the West.
Politics of masculinities is closely related to the process of 'othering' in West/non-West relations. In critical 24 and postcolonial literature 25 these relations have been examined with regard to dichotomist identity construction processes. Some critical scholars expose the gendered dimension of these identity construction processes explicitly. 26 However, how gender itself contributes to the generation of identity dichotomies between masculinities, both in inter-and intra-state relations, has only been studied by feminist IR. 27 Postcolonial feminists perform an analysis of masculinities that construct hierarchical relations within the West/non-West context through gendering. This is epitomized primarily, albeit not exclusively, in two ways. In the case of hypermasculinization, the non-West is represented and discursively reproduced as excessively authoritarian, barbaric, violent, reactionary, and irrational (or sometimes possessing 'cold rationality'). 28 The feminization of the non-West, on the other hand, constructs it as passive, emotional, and weak. 29 The gendering of the non-West is essential for its spatial construction as the other and as an underdeveloped, uncivilized, non-modern geography that requires the West's (the self) intervention and penetration to re-order. 30 In addition, as will be discussed below, for non-Western policy-makers gendering can 'naturalize' the exclusion of the non-Western state from the international society by rejecting its equality with the West, and undermining its sovereign right to conduct its domestic and international affairs independently. The question, however, remains: how does gendering operate in the politics of masculinities during the West/non-West encounters? Two answers are in order.
One can be traced to the feminist critique of Orientalism. As has been versed prevalently so far, Said argues that the West reproduces 'the self' through orientalising the East as 'the other'. 31 The East is monolithically essentialized as geography of absolute power, corruption, violence, 33 This includes the representation of Eastern women as an object of desire, a victim to be liberated by the West. 34 More importantly for the purposes of this analysis, it also involves often conflicting sexualized representations of the East as 'the other'. On the one hand, it is a woman who is exotically beautiful, aesthetic, an object of desire to be conquered and protected; on the other, it is a man who is excessively violent, aggressive, abusive, irrational, an object of fear. Following Bhabha, the colonizer is ambivalent towards the colonized: fear and desire, dislike and affection, underestimation and appraisal ambivalently co-exist. 35 Concomitant feminization and hypermasculinization of the non-West as 'the other' reflect this ambivalence. 36 The second answer to the question of how gendering works in the politics of masculinities during
West/non-West encounters can be found in Spike Peterson's 'devalorization'. Peterson argues that feminization is used to 'normalize' hierarchical power relations. The 'cultural privileging' of what is considered as masculine '(reason, agency, control, objectivity etc.) at the expense of that which is stigmatized as feminine (emotion, passivity, uncertainty, subjectivity etc.)' articulates feminization as a devalorizing practice. 37 'The more an individual or a social category is feminized, the more likely that their devaluation be assumed or presumed to be explained'. 38 As a result, power hierarchies can be naturalized and legitimized through a feminization of 'the subordinate'. 39 In other words, as there is no 'natural' or 'essential' ontology in power hierarchies between the West and the non-West, the feminization of the non-West contributes politically and epistemologically to reproducing and naturalizing the hierarchy through constructing a gendered 'other'.
Hinted yet not elaborated by Peterson, devalorization as a naturalizing and essentializing strategy of the non-West's difference and its subordination is also closely related to 'hypermasculinization'.
Hypermasculinity is conceptualized in postcolonial feminist literature as an indicator that both the colonizer and the colonized value excessive aggressiveness against each other. 40 Ling gives a twist to the concept and uses it to explain the aggressive way that Asian economies react to recast 'economic development into a retrieval of cultural-national manhood' against the West. 41 Similar to feminization, hypermasculinization can be considered as a devalorizing practice because the hypermasculinized non-West is represented as subordinate to the prudent, liberal, rational, democratic West, which is reproduced through the 'bourgeois-rational' type of masculinity stated above. This also paves the way for the naturalization of the exclusion from the West and of Western intervention to 'the hypermasculinized other'. This point leads the analysis to gendered insecurity of the non-West vis-à-vis the West.
One of the underlying dynamics that shapes West/non-West relations is the insecurity of the nonWest. However, this insecurity is not only articulated as a military threat but also as 'non-military and non-specific'. 42 Reflecting on Turkey, Bilgin argues that 'the non-specific and non-military security problem encountered by Turkey's founding leaders was one of seeking a way to negotiate difference,
given European/international society's ambivalence toward their difference'. 43 The possibility of exclusion from European/international society due to their 'difference' prompted Turkey's policymakers to adopt policies of Westernization, which 'allowed Turkey's leaders to claim the right to be treated equally and with respect'. 44 In a more comprehensive analysis that compares the socialization processes of Russia, Japan, and Turkey with the international society, Zarakol discusses the issue by engaging with the concept of ontological insecurity. In the analysis of the empires defeated by the West, she argues that particular non-Western states attempted to enter the international societydefined in Westphalian terms -from a disadvantageous position as 'non-modern' and 'underdeveloped', thus giving rise to ontological insecurity. 'Once the peoples of the old empires started accepting this worldview, it was inevitable that they too would embrace its judgement: they found themselves as coming up short, not just materially but socially and culturally'. 45 The result is the continuous efforts of the non-Western states to convince the West that they are 'catching up' with the standards.
'Ontological insecurity' is constructed through ambivalent gendered representations and reproductions of the non-West. Ambivalent as it is, the hypermasculinization and feminization of nonWestern masculinities reproduces non-Western subjects in a way that this 'devalorization' paves the way for physical insecurity. It makes the non-Western space and subjects susceptible to the so-called 'legitimate' Western political and military intervention as the holder of the temporal standards of masculinity, in order to 'civilize', 'modernize' or 'democratise' those who could not meet the 'standards'. Deriving from Bilgin's and Zarakol's conceptualizations, a second type of insecurity is articulated as falling short of meeting Western masculinities' political, economic, and social standards, and is therefore excluded from the international society and deprived of respect and equality. Represented as emotional, passive, incompetent, in need of guidance and protection from the West, and as excessively aggressive, militarist, non-modern, and irrational, it reproduces the nonWestern subject, who both desires to be like the West and to be different from it. This manifests another ambivalence.
identity epitomizes. Following Bhabha, Young argues that during the colonizer/colonized encounters, it is possible that the colonized can construct a hybrid identity which involves elements from the colonizer's identities in combination with local characteristics. The result is the generation of 'polymorphously perverse peoples who are, in Bhabha's phrase, white but not quite'. 46 In the case of Turkey, as a response to its hypermasculinization and feminization policy-makers of the Empire and
Republic embarked upon a Westernization process that aimed to reproduce the non-Western unit, including its geography and peoples, as 'white'. However, it was revealed that there was a parochial dimension of this non-Western identity: 'but not quite'. For policy-makers, this dimension, which can be embodied in the form of nationalism, renders the non-West 'different' from the West. 
Addressing Turkey's Gendered Ontological Insecurity during Military Crises
Since the identification of the Ottoman Empire as a devalorized entity ('the Sick Man of Europe'), convincing the West that the Ottoman Empire/Turkey is Western and modern has been important. In the mid-19 th century, a pro-reform Ottoman intellectual argued that:
It is absolutely necessary that we catch up with the strongest civilization in the world, to be accepted in it, and be included among the states living in the European order. In order to achieve these objectives, we must convince Europe about our reform-mindedness by practicing novelties without hesitation. If, and only if, Europe trusts us about our willingness to adopt reforms, it can accept us in its order.
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Convincing the West that the purpose of the reforms was to render the Empire 'one of them' was an embodiment of non-Western anxiety about its own self-being. Turkey's policy-makers perceived the issue as a violation of territorial waters. Both of them deployed small-scale special military units to the rocks. The crisis was averted by a US diplomatic intervention.
The Syria Crisis (2012)
The anti-communist. Just because we buy something from Russia does not mean that we get closer to it'. 70 In the post-Cold War era, Turkey's hybridity was often used as a positive value for the West: it offered a way to confirm Turkey's 'difference' from the West by repositioning it within the West.
What differentiates the AKP's multidimensional foreign policy is that it has 'cast Turkey as the leader of its own civilization, with the implication that Western civilization is not Turkey's own.' 71 The borders of this civilization are determined as the former territories of the Ottoman Empire. 72 Although the search for an 'alternative path' for Turkey can be explained by political Islamist parties'
anti-Western stance, this rhetoric has never matched practice. 73 Another explanation this analysis pursues is that AKP policy-makers attempt to address the feminization of Turkey historically by the West. In Strategic Depth, Davutoğlu states that 'Turkey made a serious and radical decision in terms of its international position: choosing to become a regional power under the umbrella of the hegemonic Western civilizational basin over being the weak leader of its own civilizational basin.' 74 For Davutoğlu, Turkey was feminized (and Turkey's policy-makers accepted it) as a country needing Western guidance and authority in its foreign policy, which could only become a regional power in the Western world order. This devalorization, however, does not correspond to Turkey's cultural/historical heritage, which could offer more than being a regional power.
Yanık argues that Davutoğlu's formulation is also built upon the hybridity in which multiculturalism renders Turkey 'centre state' rather than a bridge; in other words, not only a value for the West but an advantage for Turkey vis-à-vis the West. 75 The In short, similar to the previous centre-left and right governments, AKP foreign policy aims to address Turkey's gendered devalorization by the West. This approach has been underlined by the use of Turkey's hybridity as an identity that exists politically within the West rather than in opposition to it.
That is why comments from some EU states about the In all three periods the military crises erupted while Turkey's policy-makers were addressing gendered ontological insecurity vis-à-vis the West. The failure to tackle the military threat in accordance with the West's 'standards' underlined by the (neo)realist/liberal ideology furthered Turkey's gendered representations as weak, emotional, irrational, and excessively aggressive, militarist and authoritarian. Three discursive moves were adopted. First, the hybridity narrative, which differentiates Turkey from the West, was dropped in favour of a narrative constructing Turkey as a 'Western state'. Second, the source of military threat was feminized and hypermasculinized as irrational, emotional, aggressive, and therefore failing to meet the Western 'standards'. The 'devalorized other' was discursively separated from the West. Turkey's policy-makers hereby mimic the Western ways of dealing with the non-West. 81 Finally, related to the previous point, Turkey's identity was reconstructed in a way that meets the Western standards of rationality, prudence, and
democracy. In what follows, the elements of gendered narrative of Turkey's policy-makers in these crises will be analysed.
Turkey as a Democratic Teacher/Guide of Others
One of the most important tactics to represent Turkey as a democratic, liberal, rational, Western, state was to 'otherize' the military threat through gendering. In 1974, Turkey's policy-makers' narrative was to feminize Greece by ascribing irrationality, emotionalism, aggressiveness, authoritarianism, and misguidedness. As a result, Turkey constructed itself as a paternal figure who was ready to teach the latter what is right and wrong; in other words, as a figure who was ready to help by being tolerant towards the emotional and irrational practices of the infant. Reflecting the (neo)realist/liberal epistemology, Ecevit praised Turkey's realist and rational position as opposed to Greece's irrationality:
We are in a period when foreign policy cannot be based on emotions and revenge. The most unfortunate thing for Greeks is that they were educated based on dreams and fed by anger towards Turks…I do not think any Greek politician would say "I do not want enosis"…On the contrary, in Turkey, no politician is talking about the invasion of Cyprus…No Turkish politician says "We should get Thessaloniki back" as a response to
Greek saying "We should get Istanbul back". Why are we like this? Because we are a more realist nation.
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As a paternal figure, Turkey claimed the right to remind Greece of the benefits of being a democracy, and similarly presented Turkey as a member of the democratic Western family. After the military operation, Ecevit spoke to the media:
The most important reason why we had such a transparent and honest foreign policy
[during the crisis] was Turkey's strong democracy…In comparison with Greece, the virtue of democracy was proved true. Especially at the beginning of the crisis, one the most important weaknesses of Greek diplomacy was its lack of democratic character. It was under a dictatorial regime. Only after Greece became a democracy did it get stronger at diplomacy. 83 In the 1996 crisis with Greece Turkey again adopted a democratic teacher role, but different from the previous one due to the post-Cold War geopolitical context. Unlike 1974, Greece was an EU member state. Moreover, Turkey's democratic credentials were highly questioned by the EU. 84 As the democratic/authoritarian dichotomy became irrelevant, Turkey's foreign policy-makers chose to adopt the role of paternal figure to teach Greece how democracies should act. In this narrative, the In the last nine months, we tried to stop it [the Syrian regime] through direct engagement. This even reached to the point where we begged them…We acted with the international community…Look at the attack on our plane and the attitude we have had about it! Turkey reacted with extraordinary restraint through active diplomacy.
95
Similar discourse was adopted by Erdoğan after the bomb incident:
This was not the first attack by Syria on Turkey. There had been this type of attacks seven times, but without casualties. We were patient in every attack. In spite of our diplomatic note, Syria did not step back…As Turkey, our only objective is peace and security. We shall never have an objective of creating war.
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Turkey was continuously presented as a rational actor, respectful of the values of international society. Davutoğlu's words are indicative:
Being very experienced in statecraft, we never act in anger. We never act based on incomplete information. We first lay down our options [and then decide]…The Security Council, international community, all of them will be informed…The international community will see the photo we took. Our extensive state experience requires this.
Turkey's practices as a 'good citizen of international society' were rewarded by easing gendered insecurity. Reflecting his (neo)realist/liberal lenses, Davutoğlu stated that Turkey was backed by the international community against irrational, aggressive, authoritarian, 'devalorized' Syria:
All states expressed their condolences and in the light of the information we shared, they underlined their solidarity with Turkey…They thanked us for our restraint and tempered attitude, from the General Secretary of United Nations to Russia…Turkey has the capacity to protect its interests within the rules of international law.
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Conclusion
The feminist analysis developed above aimed to show that policy-makers in different historical and political contexts constructed a certain narrative about Turkey, the West, and others. Through this narrative, they re-constructed Turkey's non-Western masculinity to demonstrate the way in which Turkey met and meets the West's 'standards', that 'we are not barbarians'. Three conclusions can be derived from this analysis. First, the discussion accentuated that the insecurity of the non-West vis-à-vis the West cannot be fully understood without revealing how hierarchies between the two are reproduced through gendering, both between the West and non-West, and among non-Western political units. In the former, both the West and non-West are 'essentialized' and power hierarchy is 'natu- and 'the leader of its civilization' of Davutoğlu-Erdoğan. In different ways they were saying 'We are not barbarians: we belong to the West, but we are different'.
